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Abstract  
Background The Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD) is a public-private partnership in 
England involving voluntary pledges between government, and business and other public 
organisations to improve public health. One such voluntary pledge refers to the reduction of 
trans fatty acids (TFAs) in the food supply in England by either pledging not to use artificial 
TFAs or pledging artificial TFA removal. This paper evaluates the RD’s effectiveness at 
encouraging signatory organisations to remove artificially produced TFAs in their products.  
Methods We analysed publically available data submitted by RD signatory organisations’ on 
their plans and progress towards achieving the TFAs pledge, comparing 2015 progress 
reports against their delivery plans. We also assessed the extent to TFAs reductions beyond 
pre-2011 levels could be attributed to the RD.  
Results Voluntary reformulation via the RD has had limited added value, because the first 
part of the trans fat pledge simply requires organisations to confirm that they do not use 
TFAs and the second part that has the potential to reduce use has failed to attract the 
participation of food producers, particularly those producing fast foods and takeaways, 
where most remaining use of artificial TFAs is located.   
Conclusion The contribution of the RD TFAs pledges in reducing artificial TFAs from 
England’s food supply beyond pre-2011 levels appears to be negligible. This research has 
wider implications on the growing international research on voluntary food policy, and 
offers insights for other countries currently undertaking work to remove TFAs from their 
food supply.  
 
 
Keywords  
Trans-fatty acids; public-private partnership; voluntary agreement 
 
  
Introduction 
Trans fatty acids (TFAs) are unsaturated fats that occur naturally in small quantities in some 
meat and dairy products, but are predominantly consumed in an industrially-produced 
form.1 Artificial TFAs from partially hydrogenated vegetable oils (p-HVO) have been added 
to processed foods as an inexpensive way to extend food shelf-life and increase 
palatability.2 TFAs provide no nutritional role or demonstrable health benefit,3 and impart 
detrimental effects on health, particularly cardiovascular health.4  Many countries are now 
moving to either remove or reduce artificial TFAs from the food supply. The World Health 
Organization recommends that national governments virtually eliminate partially 
hydrogenated vegetable oils from the human food supply and replace artificial TFAs with 
unsaturated fats as a cost-effective “best buy” to help reduce NCDs by 25% by 2020.5  
Evidence on effectiveness of actions to reduce or remove TFAs 
The literature on the effectiveness of voluntary, legislative and regulatory policies at local 
and national level to reduce dietary TFAs concludes that regulatory approaches are more 
effective than voluntary approaches, though the latter can also contribute to minimising 
TFAs in the food supply. A 2013 systematic review by Downs et al included 26 studies 
published after 1990 (when evidence of the health effects of TFAs consumption first 
appeared) that were: empirical and conducted in a “real-world” setting; evaluating a trans 
fat policy for example on labelling, voluntary limits or bans; and studying a policy’s effect on 
trans fat levels in, for example, food, diet, blood or breast milk.6 The authors concluded that 
all options had some merit, though national and local bans were most effective at 
eliminating TFAs from food products. Conversely, mandatory trans fat labelling and the use 
of voluntary limits were reported to have variable results. A 2015 systematic review by 
Hendry et al1 independently updated the review by Downs et al6 and aimed to narrow their 
review to the effectiveness of regulatory action on levels of artificial TFAs in foods, and/or 
on individuals’ purchasing or consumption behaviors, or manufacturers’ reformulation of 
products, substitution of ingredients, promotional activities, or price changes. The authors 
reviewed seven studies of limits on artificial TFAs, which refers to either setting maximum 
upper limits (usually less than 2%) on the finished product or banning the use of artificial 
TFAs during food production. All seven studies reported considerable reductions in TFAs 
content. The authors also reviewed seven studies on mandatory labelling, six of which found 
that mandating trans fat labelling decreased the content of artificial TFAs in a wide variety 
of foods. Like Downs et al, the authors concluded that regulatory approaches to set maximal 
limits or require labelling were both effective in reducing TFAs in the food supply.  
Response to TFAs in the UK food supply 
In the UK, as early as the mid 1990s there were recommendations by the Department of 
Health to reduce TFAs consumption.7 Voluntary reformulation by the food industry 
facilitated by the UK Food Standards Agency reduced TFA in vegetable oils used in UK food 
production to a minimum (<1%).8 One study found that by 2007 the concentrations of TFAs 
in a sample of processed foods had fallen to below 0.2g/100 g (the processed foods included 
pizza, garlic bread, breakfast cereals, quiche, fat spreads, a range of fish and meat products, 
chips, savoury snacks, confectionery and ice cream).9 Thus TFA reduction efforts had already 
reached below the 2% of food energy target10 well before the start of the RD. A remaining 
concern, however, is that even though significant reductions have already been achieved, a 
substantial minority of the population could have much higher intakes than the population 
average.11 A recent study finds that one important source of TFAs in the UK is takeaways, 
with some kebab meals within the study sample having up to 5.2 g/meal.12 Thus, because 
TFAs are present in a number of often unlabelled fast foods, it is still possible to consume up 
to 20g of TFAs in one day,13 far exceeding the recommended levels.11 This echoes concerns 
of the 2010 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) report on 
cardiovascular disease risk among UK citizens,14 stating that trans-fats remained a significant 
health hazard especially for individuals living on low incomes and/or who regularly consume 
fried, baked, and other processed fast foods. 
The current response (since 2011) to TFA removal in the UK continues to be voluntary 
reformulation, under the auspices of the Public Health Responsibility Deal (RD), a public-
private partnership initiated in March 2011 and involving voluntary agreements across four 
‘networks’ (food, alcohol, health at work and physical activity).15 The RD aims to bring 
together those with an interest from government, academia, the corporate sector, public 
bodies and voluntary organisations who can commit to a range of pledges which aim to 
improve public health. At time of writing (June 2016), 776 organisations had committed to 
one or more RD pledges across the four networks.15 After committing to a pledge, signatory 
organisations are asked to provide plans for fulfilling the pledge (the ‘delivery plan’). 
Guidance is provided to organisations16 outlining a range of interventions which they can 
implement. Organisations are also asked to report their progress in the spring of each year.  
The RD pledge on reducing the level of TFAs in the food supply in England has two parts: 1) 
pledging not to use artificial TFAs (by acknowledging the statement “We do not use 
ingredients that contain artificial TFAs”); and 2) pledging artificial TFA removal (by 
responding to the statement "We are working to remove artificial TFAs from our products 
within the next 12 months.").15 Participating organisations are asked to do this voluntarily 
by either removing pHVO from foods; ensuring that the fats and oils used in the preparation 
of foods, e.g. frying oils, are less than 2% total TFAs; and/or procuring products and 
adapting their practices to remove artificial TFAs. The TFA pledge delivery plans and 
progress reports are available on the RD website.15  
Methods 
Analysis of signatory organisations’ pledges  
We analysed publically available data on RD signatory organisations’ plans and progress 
towards achieving the TFAs pledge. Each pledge document outlines a range of possible 
interventions (reported in Table 1) that a partner can choose to implement to deliver the 
pledge. We assessed progress reports provided for the TFAs pledges in 2015 against what 
had been originally set by organisations in their delivery plans.   
[Table 1 here] 
The use of ‘additionality’ to establish the counterfactual 
We assessed the extent to which organisations’ activities could be attributed to their 
participation in the RD. Though attributing causality to a national public policy such as the 
RD can be difficult as there is no obvious comparison that can be drawn, we were able to 
establish a counterfactual by employing the concept of additionality;17, 18 defined here as 
the extent to which a planned or completed activity was likely to have been brought about 
by the RD, as opposed to an activity which was already happening or would have happened 
irrespective of the RD. Thus the counterfactual was derived from assessing organisations’ 
delivery plans to ascertain which actions organisations would have taken in the absence of 
the RD. Criteria for judging the level of additionality were developed in line with the Public 
Health Outcomes Framework’s assessment criteria for indicators,19, 20 and validated.21  
Bias minimisation  
We established a range of measures to reduce bias throughout our methods by: 1) pilot 
testing our data extraction tool to remove potential inconsistencies between raters before 
the main rating began; 2) considering a delivery plan to be a statement of intent by 
organisations, and progress reports to be a statement of achievements that should be taken 
at face value; 3) rating the delivery plans independently first (blind ratings); followed by 4) 
discussion and agreement in pairs and with a third rater in the event of disagreement; and 
5) rotating the pairs of raters so that pair A-B coded delivery plans in pledge A1, Pair B-C 
coded delivery plans in pledge A3, and so forth.  
Results  
Additionality of the RD and progress against delivery plans 
The 90 signatory organisations to the pledge confirming non-use of TFAs (“We do not use 
ingredients that contain artificial TFAs”) were either food manufacturers, retailers or 
caterers. The formulation of the pledge implies that an organisation can only sign up to this 
first part if it has already stopped using TFAs, in which case, there is no possibility of any 
added value from compliance with the pledge.  Thus the added value of the RD will have 
been minimal because the first part of the TFA pledge was in effect monitoring current use 
of TFAs rather than an opportunity to set out how changes might be made to remove TFAs: 
91% of the signatory organisations (82 out of 90) were assessed either as having already 
removed TFAs, or as having had removal of TFAs underway before the RD started and, 
therefore, their actions were judged as not likely to have been brought about by the RD. 
Most of the progress reports mostly simply reconfirmed whether TFAs were being used or 
not, often recalling that removal of TFAs was undertaken several years before the RD.   
The second part of the TFA pledge does ask about plans to remove TFAs and therefore had 
the potential to encourage removal of remaining TFAs. Yet only 11 organisations signed up 
to it, of which five were catering companies and two were universities. While these partners 
were not in a position to reformulate food products at the point of manufacture, some 
reported replacing products (e.g. using different types of oils). The remaining four signatory 
organisations were pub chains, a small specialised food manufacturer, and an 
entertainment company. Three of the 11 signatory organisations were judged as likely to 
have been encouraged by the RD to make changes; and five of the 11 were judged as 
potentially likely to have been motivated by the RD to change.  
Discussion  
This evaluation finds that the RD pledge to reduce TFA in the food supply in England has had 
limited added value, in large part because the first component of the pledge relates to a 
simple statement confirming non-use of TFAs and was signed predominantly by 
organisations which had already removed TFAs before joining the RD. The reporting 
guidelines provided by the Department of Health state that “shortly after signing up to F3(a) 
(the first TFA pledge), partners will be asked to provide a delivery plan in which they must 
confirm when they met this pledge. […] There will be no further reporting for these partners 
once they have confirmed that they have completed this pledge”.22 This is arguably a 
contradiction in terms, since it involves asking for a “delivery plan” simply to confirm having 
met the pledge.  
Moreover, organisations which signed up to the second part of the pledge (which relates to 
actually removing TFAs from products) were not in a position to do so, since they were not 
manufacturers; their activities were therefore likely to have been limited to adapting their 
catering-related purchases and practices. Although this has some merit, only 11 partners 
signed up. While RD partners include major UK food manufacturers with considerable 
market share, including producers of fast food or takeaways, which are reportedly still an 
important source of TFAs consumption in the UK,12 none of these signed up to the second 
part of the TFA pledge.   
Many countries have now implemented a ban on artificial trans fats: Denmark led the way 
in 200323, 24 and crucially the ban included all imported food products. Similar bans were 
introduced in Austria and Switzerland in 2009,24 and the United States is the latest to 
announce the implementation of a trans fats ban.25 The evidence synthesis conducted as 
part of this study finds that while all interventions aimed at reducing TFAs have merit, 
regulatory approaches such as mandated national and local limits are more effective at 
minimising TFAs in the food supply than voluntary limits. This is supported by a recent 
modelling study which concludes that a regulatory policy in England to eliminate artificial 
TFAs from the food supply would be the most effective and equitable policy option.26 An 
important outcome of a ban would be that companies and small shops producing fast foods 
and takeaways (still reported to be an important source of TFAs in England12) would be 
compelled to remove the substance from their products. Finally, given the international 
trade agreements in which England participates, the risk of jeopardising the advances 
already made in national TFA reduction through, for example, the import of less regulated 
products (as reported in a 2015 European Commission report27) could be mitigated by 
strengthening standards with minimal impact on the food supply and quality, as was done in 
Denmark.23  
A positive development, to the best of our knowledge independent of the RD, appears to be 
the growing willingness of the food industry to agree a legal limit of TFAs in the food supply, 
as illustrated by an open letter28 signed by major food companies, and health and consumer 
organisations sent to the European Commission in October 2015 asking it to consider 
legislating to limit the content of industrially produced TFAs in foods to 2g per 100g fat. This 
may be an indication of political will and stakeholder buy-in within various sectors to act to 
impose a legal limit and to achieve a ‘level playing field’ for businesses.29  
With undeniable scientific evidence on the detrimental effects of TFAs’ consumption on 
heart health, it is useful to understand barriers and facilitators to TFA regulation. Reported 
barriers include competing interests, beliefs and attitudes,30 lack of standardization of TFA 
definitions; gaps in consumer and civil society advocacy,30 and a lack of consumer 
awareness and understanding of TFAs.30, 31 Facilitators to TFA regulation include supportive 
organizational infrastructures with commissioned expert task forces which can review 
scientific and policy literature,32 increased international and local visibility of the issue of 
TFAs,31 and the role of the media in facilitating food supply change by increasing consumer 
awareness and pressure on industry to meet the challenges of TFAs reduction.32  
These findings are consistent with earlier results from the wider evaluation of the RD, and 
illustrate the fundamental importance for any voluntary pledges or targets to be well-
defined, specific and measurable. In addition, as noted in related papers on this 
evaluation,33-35 reporting needs to be consistent and comprehensive, ideally involving some 
form of independent, public monitoring, rather than relying on self-reports.36  
Given the prominence of the RD within the Government’s strategy to reduce diet-related ill 
health, we consider these findings to be of great public health and policy importance. This 
research also has wider implications on the growing international research on voluntary 
food policy, and offers useful insights for other countries currently undertaking work to 
remove TFAs from their food supply, as there is limited empirical evidence on the process 
and impact of voluntary strategies to reduce TFAs.   
Limitations 
There may have been unpublished or ongoing evidence reviews we did not locate (although 
we searched all relevant sources of systematic reviews to identify published evidence), or 
new reviews published after the completion of the included reviews. Moreover, the poor 
quality of the annual reports of signatories made it difficult to provide more systematic 
assessments of signatories’ progress. Some may argue that absence of evidence differs from 
evidence that the RD is not effective, i.e. that it is possible that there is evidence of the 
effectiveness of the RD that we haven’t yet found, therefore we should assume that the RD 
is an effective policy. However, we would argue that this is a burden of proof fallacy; our in-
depth evaluation concludes that there is sufficient evidence to make the assertion that the 
RD TFA pledge is unlikely in its current formulation to be effective at reducing trans fats. 
Finally, although we made every effort to validate our methods for assessing progress 
against plans, and to reduce bias, we were assessing delivery plans written by organisations 
which may not initially have received much guidance on what and how to write these 
documents. Thus it is possible, though we believe highly unlikely, that organisations 
inadvertently under-played their achievements.  
Conclusions  
Trans fats have no demonstrable health benefits or nutritional role, and they are harmful to 
heart health. Though average per capita use has fallen to acceptable levels in recent years 
due to earlier successful voluntary approaches, TFAs remain in the English food supply, 
particularly in fast foods and takeaways. The evidence indicates that the most effective way 
to remove the remaining artificial TFAs is by law at the point of manufacture. Yet, the RD 
TFAs pledge is highly unlikely to make a significant additional contribute to efforts to 
remove TFAs from the food supply in England, given that part of it merely encourages 
monitoring of TFA use, while the other part on reformulation has failed to engage major 
manufacturers or producers of fast foods.  
Conflicts of interest  
None declared.  
Acknowledgements 
The evaluation of the Public Health Responsibility Deal is part of the programme of the 
Policy Innovation Research Unit (http://www.piru.ac.uk/). This is an independent research 
unit based at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, funded by the 
Department of Health Policy Research Programme. Sole responsibility for this research lies 
with the authors and the views expressed are not necessarily those of the Department of 
Health. The Department of Health played no role in the design of the study, the 
interpretation of the findings, the writing of the paper, or the decision to submit.  
 
Key points  
 The strategies likely to be effective in reducing or removing TFAs are not reflected in the 
Responsibility Deal TFA pledges.  
 The design of the RD pledges to remove TFA in the food supply was problematic, with 
the first component of the pledge relating to a simple statement confirming non-use of 
TFAs.  
 The component of the TFA pledge which encouraged reduction in TFA use failed to 
attract the participation of food producers, particularly those producing fast foods and 
takeaways.  
 Our evaluation concludes that the current RD TFA pledges are unlikely to contribute to 
the RD’s stated objective of improving public health.  
 
  
References  
1 Hendry VL, et al. Impact of Regulatory Interventions to Reduce Intake of Artificial 
Trans–Fatty Acids: A Systematic Review. American Journal of Public Health 2015; 105: e32-
e42.  
2 Mozaffarian D, et al. Removing industrial trans fat from foods. BMJ 2010; 340: c1826.  
3 Uauy R, et al. WHO Scientific Update on trans fatty acids: summary and conclusions. 
Eur J Clin Nutr 2009; 63: S68-S75.  
4 Brouwer IA, et al. Trans fatty acids and cardiovascular health: research completed? 
Eur J Clin Nutr 2013; 67: 541-7.  
5 WHO. Global action plan for the prevention and control of noncommunicable 
diseases 2013-2020. Geneva: World Health Organization.  2013.  
6 Downs S, et al. The effectiveness of policies for reducing dietary trans fat: a 
systematic review of the evidence. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2013; 91: 262-
9H.  
7 Department of Health. Nutritional aspects of cardiovascular disease. Report of the 
cardiovascular review group of the committee on medical aspects of food policy. In Report 
on health and social subjects. Vol. 46. London: HMSO.  1994.  
8 FSA. Minutes of the Board meeting, 13 December 2007, Hotel Russell, Russell 
Square, London. http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/board/boardmins13dec07.pdf.  
2007.  
9 Roe M, et al. Trans fatty acids in a range of UK processed foods. Food chemistry 
2013; 140: 427-31.  
10 Bates B, et al. National Diet and Nutrition Survey Results from Years 1, 2, 3 and 4 
(combined) of the Rolling Programme (2008/2009 – 2011/2012). London: Public Health 
England.  2014.  
11 Micha R, et al. Trans fatty acids: effects on cardiometabolic health and implications 
for policy. Prostaglandins, leukotrienes, and essential fatty acids 2008; 79: 147-52.  
12 Davies IG, et al. Saturated and trans-fatty acids in UK takeaway food. International 
journal of food sciences and nutrition 2016; 67: 217-24.  
13 Stender S, et al. High levels of industrially produced trans fat in popular fast foods. N 
Engl J Med 2006; 354: 1650-2.  
14 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. Prevention of cardiovascular 
disease. Issued: June 2010. NICE public health guidance 25 (guidance.nice.org.uk/ph25). 
Manchester: NICE.  2010.  
15 Department of Health. The Public Health Responsibility Deal 
https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/.  2014.  
16 Department of Health. How progress is reported 
(https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/monitoring-progress/).  2012.  
17 Hind J. Additionality: a useful way to construct the counterfactual qualitatively? 
Evaluation Journal of Australasia 2010; 10: 28-35.  
18 Heinrich M. Demonstrating additionality in private sector development initiatives. A 
Practical Exploration of Good Practice for Challenge Funds and other Cost-Sharing 
Mechanisms. The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) April 2014.  2014.  
19 Department of Health. Public Health Outcomes Framework. Improving outcomes 
and supporting transparency. Part 1B: Appendices.  2013.  
20 Department of Health E. (2012) The Public Health Outcomes Framework "Healthy 
lives, healthy people: Improving outcomes and supporting transparency". 2012. 
21 Knai C, et al. The Public Health Responsibility deal: has a public–private partnership 
brought about action on alcohol reduction? Addiction 2015: n/a-n/a.  
22 Department of Health. Public Health Responsibility Deal. Pledge on Artificial Trans 
Fat (F3) https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/pledges/pledge/?pl=29 (accessed 6 May 2016).  
23 Stender S, et al. What went in when trans went out? N Engl J Med 2009; 361: 314-6.  
24 Coombes R. Trans fats: chasing a global ban. BMJ 2011; 343: d5567.  
25 Sifferlin A. Feds to Eradicate Trans Fats from Food Supply By 2018. 16 June 2015, 
Time.com (http://time.com/3922583/trans-fats-hydrogenated-oils/).  2015.  
26 Allen K, et al. Potential of trans fats policies to reduce socioeconomic inequalities in 
mortality from coronary heart disease in England: cost effectiveness modelling study. Bmj 
2015; 351: h4583.  
27 European Commission. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council regarding TFAs in foods and in the overall diet of the Union population. 
December 2015. .  2015.  
28 BEUC C, EHN, EPHA, Kellogg Company, Mars, Mondelēz and Nestlé,. Open Letter: Call 
for a legislative limit for the amount of industrially produced TFAs in foods. Brussels, 15 
October 2015 
http://epha.org/IMG/pdf/Open_Letter_industrially_produced_TFAs_freeEU.pdf.  2015.  
29 Durand MA, et al. An evaluation of the Public Health Responsibility Deal: Informants' 
experiences and views of the development, implementation and achievements of a pledge-
based, public-private partnership to improve population health in England. Health Policy 
2015; 119: 1506-14.  
30 Pérez-Ferrer C, et al. Learning from international policies on trans fatty acids to 
reduce cardiovascular disease in low- and middle-income countries, using Mexico as a case 
study. Health Policy and Planning 2010; 25: 39-49.  
31 Colon-Ramos U, et al. Translating research into action: a case study on trans fatty 
acid research and nutrition policy in Costa Rica. Health Policy and Planning 2007; 22: 363-74.  
32 L’Abbe MR SS, Skeaff M,  Ghafoorunissa, Tavella M. Approaches to removing trans 
fats from the food supply in industrialized and developing countries. European Journal of 
Clinical Nutrition 2009; 63: S50–S67.  
33 Knai C, et al. Has a public–private partnership resulted in action on healthier diets in 
England? An analysis of the Public Health Responsibility Deal food pledges Food Policy 2015; 
54: 1-10.  
34 Knai C, et al. The Public Health Responsibility deal: has a public-private partnership 
brought about action on alcohol reduction? Addiction 2015; 110: 1217-25.  
35 Knai C, et al. Getting England to be more physically active: are the Public Health 
Responsibility Deal's physical activity pledges the answer? . International Journal of 
Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 2015.  
36 Bryden A, et al. Voluntary agreements between government and business-A scoping 
review of the literature with specific reference to the Public Health Responsibility Deal. 
Health Policy 2013; 110: 186-97.  
 
  
Table 1. RD pledges on trans fatty acids  
Trans Fat 
pledge  
Interventions described in the section “How you can deliver this 
pledge”22 
F3(a). Non use 
of Artificial 
Trans Fat 
No interventions, just confirmation of delivery of this pledge i.e. that 
artificial TFAs are not used.  
F3(b). Artificial 
Trans Fat 
Removal 
Businesses who have not already done so are asked to : 
 remove partially hydrogenated vegetable oils (pHVO) from foods. 
 ensure that the fats and oils used in the preparation of foods, eg 
frying oils, are less than 2 per cent total trans. 
 procure products and adapt their practices to remove artificial 
TFAs. 
Source: Department of Health 2016 22 
 
 
 
